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Emotional disagreement
The role of semantic content in the expression of, 
and disagreement over, emotional values
Isidora Stojanovic, Institut Jean-Nicod – CNRS – ENS – EHESS
Abstract
When we describe an event as sad or happy, we attribute to it a certain emotional  
value. Attributions of emotional value depend essentially on an agent (and on his or 
her emotional responses); and yet, people readily disagree over such values. My aim 
in this paper is to explain what happens in the case of "emotional disagreement", and, 
more generally, to provide some insight into the semantics of value-attributions. 
Résumé
Lorsque  nous  décrivons  un  évènement  comme étant  triste  ou  heureux,  nous  lui 
attribuons une certaine valeur émotive. Les attributions de valeur émotive dépendent 
toujours d'un agent (et de ses réponses et états émotifs);  cependent, les gens sont 
fréquemment en désaccord sur de telles valeurs. Mon but dans le présent article sera 
d'expliquer le phénomène de "désaccord émotif", puis, plus généralement, d'éclairer 
certains aspects de la sémantique des attributions de valeurs. 
Introduction
This paper aims to shed some light on the semantics of expressions of emotional  
value (such as "sad" and its compounds, like "it is sad that"). Such expressions bear 
striking similarities to predicates of personal taste (such as "delicious"); in particular, 
they also generate the so-called cases of faultless disagreement. In line with previous 
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work, I will argue that genuine disagreement is never faultless. What happens is, 
rather, that at a first glance, we get both the intuition that there is disagreement and  
the intuition that each of the disagreeing parties is right, but further scrutiny makes 
one intuition prevail over the other, on a case to case basis. This, I argue, can be 
explained by taking the lexical meaning of expressions of emotion to underspecify  
the  truth-conditional  content  of  judgments  involving  such  expressions  (i.e.  the 
conditions on what the world must be like for the judgment to come out true). 
After  developing  and  discussing  this  "underspecification  hypothesis"  in  some 
detail, I will address the problem of residual disagreement, by which I mean the fact 
that even once the disagreeing parties clarify the intended interpretation of their 
value-judgments,  it  still  remains  unclear  on  which  grounds  they  could  possibly 
resolve their disagreement. I will suggest that, in such a case, underspecification is 
even more extreme, in that the concepts themselves associated with the values over 
which the disagreement bears are  open-ended: whether the concept applies to a 
given instance or not is not yet settled by the previous uses of the concept. In this 
respect, residual disagreement can be viewed, or so I argue, as a kind of  practical  
disagreement, where what is at  issue is how to best  shape concepts that are still  
under construction. 
Emotional disagreement 2 Isidora Stojanovic
Section I  introduces  the  phenomenon of  faultless  disagreement,  while  sect.  II 
provides a survey of the existing accounts. Sect. III lays down the underspecification 
hypothesis, which is then put to work in sect. IV to resolve the puzzle of faultless  
disagreement. The aim of section V is to position the account defended in this paper 
vis-à-vis other accounts, in particular, contextualist and relativist. Finally, sect. VI 
raises and addresses the problem of residual disagreement.     
I Faultless disagreement over emotional value
Consider the following case. You tell me that it's sad that Joshua's wife is leaving him 
after twenty years of marriage. I disagree. I reply that there is nothing sad about it,  
that  he  totally  deserves  it.  We  go  on  disagreeing,  and  we  are  both  rational,  so 
presumably either you or I must be wrong. At the same time, it seems that all that 
one could possibly require for a sentence of the form "it is sad that p", as said by some 
person, to be true, is that this person  finds it sad that p should be the case. But of 
course, if you find it sad that Joshua's wife is leaving him, and I don't, then we are 
both speaking truly,  so we can't be really disagreeing! 
The phenomenon of  faultless disagreement, as I understand it, stands simply for 
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the  fact  that  there  are  situations  in  which  we  have  these  two  equally  strong 
intuitions that go against each other: 
The disagreement intuition:
The two parties genuinely disagree and contradict each other.
The faultlessness intuition:
Assuming that both parties are sincere, neither of them expresses a falsehood.
Faultless disagreement has received a great amount of interest in recent years, 
although the discussion has focused on two paradigm cases: predicates of personal  
taste, such as "tasty" and "fun", and epistemic modals, such as "might" or "must".1 In 
this  paper,  I  shall  discuss  faultless  disagreement  as  it  arises  with  expressions  of  
emotional value. My working example is the predicate "sad" and the corresponding 
sentential operator "it is sad that". 
The problem to which the phenomenon of faultless disagreement gives rise can be 
regarded a set of independently plausible but mutually inconsistent assumptions, two 
of which are supported by the two intuitions pointed out earlier, and two of which 
come from more general theoretical assumptions. For the sake of clarity, let me first 
lay down the example:
1 About faultless disagreement involving taste predicates, see e.g. Kölbel 2002, Lasersohn 2005; 
involving epistemic modals, Egan et al. 2003; involving both, Stephenson 2007, MacFarlane 2012.
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(1) Abelard: It is sad that Joshua's wife is leaving him after 20 years of marriage.
(2) Eloise: No, that isn't sad at all.
The following four assumptions lead to contradiction.
a: Abelard in (1) and Eloise in (2) disagree and contradict each other.
b: Assuming that Abelard finds it sad, while Eloise doesn't, that Joshua's 
wife is leaving him, neither (1) nor (2) express falsehoods.
c: (1) has a truth value, and so does (2).
d:  For any two utterances u1 and u2, the utterer of u1 disagrees with the 
utterer of u2, and they contradict each other, only if: 
if u1 is true, then u2 is false, and if u1 is false, then u2 is true.
As with any dilemma – or, in the present case, quadrilemma – the choice among 
the competing views will depend on the issue of which assumption can be given up 
most easily. In Stojanovic (2007), in relation to predicates of personal taste, I argued 
that one should reject either a or b, but on a case to case basis. One of my goals in 
this  paper  will  be  to  offer  a  solution  along  similar  lines  for  the  expressions  of  
emotional value.2 In a nutshell, the idea is that a dialogue like (1)-(2) triggers, at a 
2 Importantly, I will suggest that in certain cases, it is c that should be rejected, the idea being that 
(1) and (2) do not yet have a truth value at the time of disagreement, but subsequently, they come 
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first glance, both the disagreement and the faultlessness intuition, but that one of the 
two intuitions won't survive further scrutiny. Once we gather enough information 
on the context in which the dialogue takes place, and in particular, on the intentions 
of the two speakers and on the ways in which their dialogue might continue, we can 
resolve it either into a case of genuine disagreement, that is, of contradiction, or into  
a case of simultaneous truth (or, at least, non-falsehood) of the two utterances.
While the proposal just outlined was implicit in Stojanovic (2007), in this paper I 
shall formulate it more carefully, and present it as an empirical hypothesis, which I 
shall call the “Underspecification Hypothesis.” The gist of this hypothesis is that the 
lexical meaning of predicates of taste like "tasty", but also of predicates of emotion 
like  "sad"  and  compounds  thereof,  essentially  underspecifies  the  complete  truth-
conditional content of the claims and judgments that we make using such predicates. 
I will lay down and motivate this hypothesis in sections III and IV, while in sect. V, I 
will  show  that  the  underspecification  hypothesis  does  not  commit  yet  to  any 
particular account of predicates of emotion, and can be handled in several ways. I 
will  also  put  forward  the  sort  of  account  that  I  favor,  which  can  be  labeled 
to be either true or false (and when the one is true, the other is false, so that we get a difference in 
truth value retrospectively). This happens, I believe, in cases of residual disagreement, discussed in 
sect. VI, which I did not consider in Stojanovic (2007).  
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“contextualist”,  and on which the move from the lexically encoded content to the 
complete truth-conditional content relies on pragmatic processes fairly similar to 
those involved in the resolution of covert pronouns. But before I move on to my own 
solution to the quadrilemma given by the inconsistency of a, b, c and d, let me briefly 
discuss, in the next section, some other solutions that have been proposed. 
II A quick glance at the existing accounts
The  family  of  views  tagged  with  the  labels  like  "absolutism",  "invariantism", 
"objectivism" or "realism", find their way out of our quadrilemma by rejecting b. In 
other  words,  such a  view will  hold  that  the  issue  of  whether  an  event  such as 
Joshua's being left by his wife is sad or isn't can be decided without reference to any 
agent and his or her emotional response to the event at stake. And of course, if there 
is such an agent-independent answer to such issues, that explains how there can be 
disagreement and contradiction over sentences involving expressions of emotional 
value. The main problem that such views face is to account for the intuitive force 
behind  b,  and  to  be  able  to  systematically  predict  truth  values  that  match  the 
ordinary  speakers'  intuitions.  You  might  fear  that  my  own  view,  which  rejects 
sometimes  a, sometimes  b, on a case to case basis, is going to encounter the same 
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problem. But, as we will see, the cases in which b gets rejected are precisely those in 
which  the  intuition  that  there  are  objective  or  agent-independent  grounds  for 
deciding whether something is sad outweighs the intuition that the truth value of a 
given claim depends on some agent's emotional response.
It is sometimes believed that just as absolutist views reject b once and for all, the 
family of views labeled as “contextualist” reject a once and for all. I believe that this 
characterization of contextualism is incorrect, even though there are probably views 
that hold indeed that a claim of the form 'it is sad that p' are always covertly about 
the speaker's emotions and emotional  responses. Such views will,  of course, have 
difficulties explaining why people disagree over matters of emotional value. They 
will also have difficulties accounting for the difference between 'it is sad that p' and 'I 
find it sad that  p', since those two expressions end up being synonymous on such 
views. 
In principle, our quadrilemma can also be resolved by giving up c or d. There are 
two rather different types of proposal that give up c. One is the view (or the family of 
views) tagged by labels like "expressivism". As applied to expressions of emotion, the 
idea would be that, just as a mere facial expression of sadness does not have a truth 
value, and that weeps and cries are similarly truth valueless, it may be plausible to 
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view speech acts made with sentences containing expressions of emotion as mere 
displays of emotion that are similarly devoid of truth value. Another view that also 
finds its ways out of the quadrilemma by rejecting c, but that does not reject the idea 
itself that a sentence containing an expression of emotion may, in principle, have a 
truth value,  is  what could be called the  presuppositional  approach,  according to 
which the use of a predicate of taste (or, in our case, of emotion) introduces what has 
come to be called a "presupposition of commonality (see López de Sa 2008). The idea, 
as I understand it, is that a judgment of taste, or any other evaluative judgment of the 
same ilk, is felicitous, and can have a truth value, only in a context in which the 
standards of taste, or other evaluative criteria, are shared among the conversation 
participants. If there are no shared standards or criteria, the presupposition fails, and 
the sentence lacks a  truth value as it  would in any other case of  presupposition 
failure.
As for rejecting d, that is the move made by certain “relativist” views, as in Kölbel 
2002, Lasersohn 2005, as well as Richard 2008.3 Note that other relativist views (in 
particular, John MacFarlane's) are not willing to give up  d outright. I take it to be 
rather obvious why one would want c and d to be the last ones to go. For one thing, 
3 I came to believe that Richard's view is somewhat more complex and should not be seen as a mere 
rejection of d. For discussion, see Stojanovic 2011.
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positing a split between sentences that behave in the same way – e.g. sentences that 
get embedded under truth-functional operators such as the negation, that occur as 
antecedents of the conditionals, and so on – and taking certain among them to be 
true or false and others to be simply deprived of truth value, is a move whose cost is  
very high, while the benefits are relatively low (for instance, expressivism will have 
a hard time to account for the fact that rational, linguistically competent speakers 
engage in disagreement over emotional value). For another, to say that there can be a 
“disagreement”  even  if  both  parties  are  simultaneously  right  is  tantamount  to 
redefining the term 'disagreement', and associating with it a concept that just isn't  
our ordinary concept of disagreement. In other words, there is nothing problematic 
to have a  technical  notion of disagreement that does not conform to  d. But if this 
should constitute a viable way out of the problem, then we must be told how this 
technical notion relates to the ordinary, intuitive notion.  
Let me, then, close this section by making an important concession, namely that I  
have surveyed the various options and tentative proposals only in rough moves, and 
that the difficulties that I have briefly pointed out are neither knockdown objections 
nor  insuperable  obstacles.  Let  me  also  emphasize  that,  to  my  knowledge,  none 
among  the  accounts  just  discussed  has  been  explicitly  applied  to  expressions  of 
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emotions.  But to the extent that faultless  disagreement arises in a  similar  (if  not 
exactly the same) way with predicates of personal taste, the accounts devised for 
these are straightforwardly applicable to predicates of emotion. At any rate, my goal 
in this paper is certainly not to argue that all the existing proposals fail and that 
mine is the only one that works. My goal is to lay out, clarify, and give credibility to a 
certain proposal – a task to which I now turn.  
III A first stab at the underspecification hypothesis
My proposal, in a nutshell, is that the question of whether a dialogue like the one 
illustrated in (1)-(2) is an instance of a genuine disagreement, or merely a dispute 
that arises from some form of misunderstanding, or, thirdly, merely an expression of  
the  two  parties'  respective  emotional  responses,  is  a  question  that  cannot  be 
answered  as  it  stands,  without  learning  more  about  the  context  in  which  the 
dialogue  takes  place,  and  about  the  two  parties'  beliefs  and  communicative 
intentions. Furthermore, I hold that the reason why the answer can only be given 
once the context has been made specific enough is that the linguistic expressions 
involved  in  (1)  and  (2)  lack  meanings  specific  enough that  would  enable  us  to 
determine the conditions on what the world must be like for (1) or (2) to come out  
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true.4 This  idea  is  what  lies  behind  the  underspecification  hypothesis,  which  I 
propose to formulate as follows: 
The Underspecification Hypothesis:
The  lexical  meanings  of  the  expressions  that  occur  in sentences 
such as (1) or (2), their syntax, and the semantic values of overt 
indexicals  (such as  personal  and  temporal  pronouns),  altogether 
underspecify the conditions on what the world must be like for an 
utterance of (1), or of (2), to be true.
Before  discussing  at  greater  length  what  the  underspecification  hypothesis 
amounts to, let me outline an intuitive understanding of the idea, albeit on a slightly 
different case. Imagine Abelard and Eloise in a furniture store buying a sofa, and 
consider this dialogue between them:
(3) Abelard: This sofa is very comfortable.
(4) Eloise: No, it is quite uncomfortable.
4 I would like to put emphasis on the idea that the meanings associated with the sentences in (1) and 
(2) are not specific enough to enable us to determine what the world needs to be like for (1) and 
(2) to be true. Note, however, that the notion of truth conditions can also be understood is a way 
that makes it possible to identify meaning with truth conditional content. We would then say, for 
example, that 'it is sad that p' is true at world w, time t, and with respect to agent a, iff p is sad from 
the viewpoint of a in w at t. This gives us conditions not only on what the world needs to be like, 
but also on what the agent and the time need to be like, in order for an utterance of 'it is sad that p' 
to be true (with respect to the world, agent and time at stake). I have argued elsewhere that there is 
no reason not to view such conditions as “truth conditions”; see Stojanovic 2008: 22-23.
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The case of (3)-(4) displays the features of faultless disagreement, and can be used 
to generate the very same quadrilemma that we had with (1)-(2). Does this mean 
that  de confortibus non est disputandum? Note though that by only modifying the 
example slightly, we can spot peculiar features of the predicate "comfortable". Thus 
imagine Abelard and Eloise in a shoe store, having just tried on (one after the other) 
the very same pair of shoes:
(5) Eloise: These shoes are very comfortable.
(6) Abelard: No, they are quite uncomfortable!
In the case of (5)-(6), there is no faultless disagreement. Rather, Abelard's claim is 
ambiguous between denying Eloise's claim – which would amount to denying that 
the shoes are comfortable to her – and claiming that the shoes are uncomfortable – 
to him! In either case, Abelard's replique strikes us as bizarre. If the former, then 
there is disagreement, but an epistemically weird one, since what evidence could 
possibly allow Abelard to rationally question Eloise's  judgment that concerns her 
own feeling of comfort? And if the latter, then the faultlessness intuition overthrows 
completely the disagreement intuition: of course a pair of shoes that are comfortable 
to  Eloise  need not  be  comfortable  at  all  to  Abelard!  Note  also  that  if  (6)  is  thus 
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interpreted, the negation marker "no" becomes rather infelicitous. 
The  upshot  of  this  example  is  to  shed  light  on  the  role  of  context  in  the  
interpretation of expressions such as "comfortable". In the context of shopping for a 
sofa, the issue of whether the sofa at stake is comfortable leaves ample room for 
disagreement, while in the context of shopping for a pair of shoes, the issue can be 
settled by determining whether the shoes at stake are comfortable to the person who 
shall be wearing them (and who, in this case, is the speaker).5 
Before leaving matters of comfort and turning back to emotional matters, there is 
something else worth pointing out – just so that we can ignore it for the rest of the  
paper. Adjectives like "comfortable" are gradable adjectives, and their interpretation 
depends on the context insofar as it requires a specification of a comparison class, as 
well as of a scale and of a threshold within the given comparison class. To illustrate 
this form of context-dependence of adjectives like "comfortable", consider again a 
certain pair of shoes, and suppose that they are stiletto shoes. As a matter of rule, 
5 Let me stress that I am not suggesting that whenever 'comfortable' occurs in application to 'shoes', it  
means 'comfortable to the speaker'.  For, suppose that the following is said by Mr. Wang who is a  
shoemaker:
(1)  All the shoes you find in this shop are comfortable.
It would be ridiculous to interpret Mr. Wang as saying that all those shoes are comfortable to him – if  
for nothing else, then because the shoes are of various sizes, and some won't even fit his feet. Rather,  
the most plausible interpretation would go along the following lines:
(2)  For all x and all y: if x is a shoe that you find in this shop, and if y is appropriately related to x, 
then x is comfortable to y.
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stilettos,  with  their  slender,  sharp-pointed  heels,  are  rather  uncomfortable.  Now 
suppose that a friend of mine, whose feet are the same size as mine, needs to borrow 
shoes from me as we are about to go on a mountain hike. I tell her:
(7) These shoes are comfortable.
If I can equally well lend some flat-sole walking shoes, which would be much 
more comfortable than the stilettos, then what I say in (7) is false. On the other hand, 
if I utter (7) in the context of going to some fancy party, where the only alternatives  
are other stiletto shoes, then what I say in (7) may well be true (assuming that the 
shoes at stake are comfortable insofar as stiletto shoes go). 
We should expect adjectives of emotional value to be subject to the same sort of 
context-dependence as other gradable adjectives. Thus it may be a sad thing that 
Abelard  got  a  stomach  flu  during  his  holidays  in  the  context  of  discussing  the 
holidays of his colleagues who all had a wonderful time. On the other hand, if the  
relevant comparison class consists of events like Abelard's cousin being diagnosed 
with incurable cancer, his having been abused as a child, etc.,  then his getting a 
stomach flu will be hardly deemed a sad event at all. This being clarified, I shall  
ignore comparison-class sensitivity for the rest of the paper.
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IV Underspecification and expressions of emotion
Let us now see how the underspecification hypothesis connects with expressions of 
emotional value. The suggestion is that the sentence “It is sad that Joshua's wife is 
leaving him after 20 years of marriage” in (1), and, similarly, the negation of this  
sentence in (2), can be used in different contexts to express different things. I will  
only pay attention to the most obvious readings.6 
On the strongest reading, what Abelard wants to and, presumably, does express 
(under  appropriate  circumstances)  with  (1),  is  what  could  be  more  explicitly 
expressed as follows:   
(8) It is sad for everyone that Joshua's wife is leaving him after 20 years of 
marriage.
Of  course,  as  with  quantifier  phrases  in  general,  there  may  be  a  contextual 
restriction on the domain over which the quantifier "everyone" ranges. For instance, 
in the context at stake, the contextually restricted domain might include Joshua, his 
6 Very little weight, if any, should be put on the idea that there will be "different things expressed" by 
different occurrences of the same sentence. In my previous work on assertion and what is said, I 
argued that even in the case of ordinary indexicals, we can maintain a notion of what is said (and, 
similarly, of what is expressed) that does not include any contextual elements over and above the 
lexically encoded material (see Stojanovic 2008: 121-130). Similarly, when, using linguists' 
jargon, I talk about the different "readings", that is just a façon de parler and shouldn't be given 
much weight either.
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wife,  and all  their  family and friends (including Abelard and Eloise).  Now, what 
happens when Eloise in (2) negates the sentence that Abelard asserted? Again, the 
underspecification hypothesis leaves several  options.  And again,  we may want to 
give the expression of emotion the strong,  “universal”  reading,  so that embedded 
under the negation operator, Eloise's claim could be more explicitly stated as follows: 
(9) It is not the case that it is sad for everyone that Joshua's wife is leaving him 
after 20 years of marriage.
Note that on this reading, Abelard and Eloise contradict each other indeed – but 
only one of them will, in that case, be right. If we interpret (1) in a way that makes it  
equivalent to (8), and if we similarly interpret (2) as equivalent to (9), then, faced 
with our quadrilemma, we would reject b (i.e. the assumption that neither party says 
something false). 
It is important to note, however, that it is not enough to give the expression of 
emotion such a “universal” reading to secure contradiction. What is also required is 
that the two parties agree, implicitly or explicitly, on the domain over which the 
quantifier ranges (see Stojanovic 2012). Thus, if Abelard intends the domain to be 
restricted to Joshua and his friends and family, while Eloise intends a larger domain 
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that also includes Joshua's wife (and the people on her side), then there is no more 
disagreement between Abelard and Eloise than there is between a mathematician 
who says “there is a number that has no predecessor” and another who “denies” this,  
when the former is talking of positive integers only, and the latter, of all integers, 
including negative ones.   
 Importantly, the underspecification hypothesis also allows for the possibility that 
(1) and (2) are both simultaneously true. As we have just seen, that may already 
happen when the two sentences' respective interpretations are as in (8) and (9), but 
the domains over which the quantifiers range are different. If the speakers are aware 
of this difference, then the dialogue in (1)-(2) will typically end there. But Abelard 
and Eloise could also go on "disagreeing”, which is symptomatic of those cases in 
which the speakers take it for granted that they are talking of the same domain,  
whereas in fact, they are not.
I believe that "it is sad that" need not always receive a “universal” reading (or, for 
that matter, a weaker, generic reading) and that it can be given what we might call  
an “indexical” reading, on which "it is sad that" is roughly equivalent to " to me, it is 
sad that", and is more naturally expressed by "I find it sad that". In conversations in 
which it  is  mutually clear  that this  is the intended specification,  the two parties' 
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prima facie dispute typically comes to a halt: since each person is talking about what 
he or she finds sad, there is little point to deny or contradict what the other person is 
saying. In this sort of case, it is the assumption a of our quadrilemma that we would 
reject. 
Before closing this section, let me point out that even when it is mutually clear 
that the intended interpretation is an indexical one, the two parties might still try to 
convince one another that their respective emotional responses are somehow “better” 
or more appropriate. To appreciate this point, consider some sad event (e.g. Abelard's 
cousin being diagnosed with incurable cancer) and suppose that someone tells you 
that she finds the event rather amusing. If the person is sincere, then it would be 
unreasonable of you to try to convince her that she told you something false: if she 
sincerely says that she finds it amusing, then it can only be true that she does find it  
amusing. However, there is a sense in which you may try to prove her to be wrong: 
the event at stake just isn't amusing, and those who find it amusing are wrong in 
finding it so. So even in cases in which assumption a gets rejected, there is something 
that looks like disagreement: the two parties strive to prove each other to be wrong 
(in the sense just discussed, but not in the sense of making contradictory claims) and 
may well appeal to arguments to show the other to be wrong. Disagreement, in such 
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cases, seems to be disagreement over what one should find sad or amusing. This, in 
turn, may either be assimilated to the normative case (viz. on what one  ought to  
consider sad or amusing), or to a kind of practical disagreement (viz. on what kind 
of behavior one had better adopt in given circumstances). What matters it that it is 
definitely not disagreement in the sense of contradiction, which is required to derive 
inconsistency from assumptions a to d, and is central to faultless disagreement.7
V  Semantic underspecification and the contextualism-
relativism debate
It  has  been held  (e.g.  in Kölbel  2002,  Lasersohn 2005)  that  the  phenomenon of 
faultless  disagreement  requires abandoning our  traditional  semantic  frameworks, 
and adopting a new framework: that of “relativist” semantics. In Stojanovic 2007, I  
argued that relativist semantics (or, more precisely, any framework along the lines of 
the one proposed in Lasersohn 2005) is nothing more than a notational variant of 
the  more  traditional  “contextualist”  semantics  that  does  not  posit  any  special 
7 To draw what I hope is a helpful analogy, suppose that Abelard and Eloise are discussing the idea 
of whether to have an ice-cream after each has already had a dessert. Abelard's argument is that 
the ice-cream at stake is really delicious, while Eloise's argument is that they've already had dessert 
and will feel sick from eating too much. When Abelard finally says “Well, me, I'll have an ice-
cream”, and Eloise replies “Well, me, no, I won't have an ice-cream”, we might say that they haven't 
quite resolved their disagreement – but we would not consider that to be a case of faultless 
disagreement. 
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parameter in the circumstances of evaluation,  but holds that  there is an implicit 
argument, of the same type as the parameter at stake, associated with the predicate 
under consideration. For example, in relativist semantics, "delicious" is a one-place 
predicate, but sentences are evaluated for their truth value with respect to a “judge” 
parameter, whereas in contextualist semantics, 'delicious' is a two-place predicate 
one of whose argument is of type “judge”. I have argued that from the standpoint of 
semantics  alone,  the  distinction  between  a  framework  that  posits  such  a  judge 
parameter vs. one that associates a judge argument with any given predicate of taste 
is pretty much a distinction without a difference. For, given a sentence containing a 
predicate of personal taste (or, for that matter, an expression of emotional value),  
and given an assignment of values to the parameters deployed in the definitions of  
truth (including all the relevant contextual parameters), the contextualist and the 
relativist  semantics,  if  suitably construed,  will  predict  the same truth value.8 The 
upshot  of  this  result,  which  is  what  matters  for  the  purposes  of  the  present 
8 This result can be established using a familiar model-theoretic method of defining a bi-directional 
translation procedure between the two formal languages. In a nutshell, what one shows is that 
given a sentence of one of the two formal languages, a structure of interpretation, and an 
assignment of values to the relevant parameters, this sentence is true if and only if the translation 
of that sentence in the other formal language is true in a suitably related structure of 
interpretation for a suitably related assignment of values. For details, see Stojanovic 2007: 699-
703. 
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discussion,  is  that  it  is  difficult  to  see  how there  could  be  any  purely  semantic 
motivations  for  preferring relativism over  contextualism (or  for  that  matter,  for 
preferring contextualism over relativism). It also follows that faultless disagreement, 
however we analyze it, cannot in and by itself motivate relativist semantics. For, from 
the point of view of semantics, relativism is just a notational variant of the traditional 
framework,  so  that  if  a  phenomenon  (whether  of  faultless  disagreement  or  of 
something else) is to be considered as a motivation for a certain semantics, it can 
only be so if we make some extra-semantic assumptions (for instance, concerning 
computational complexity, the syntax-semantics interface, the semantics-pragmatics 
interface, and the like). In other words, whether relativist semantics is any better off 
than contextualist  semantics  with respect  to  faultless  disagreement  will  crucially 
depend on how semantics relates, if at all, to the theory of disagreement. 
My  goal  in  the  present  section  is  to  show  that  the  account  of  faultless 
disagreement  that  I  have  outlined  above,  grounded  upon the  Underspecification 
hypothesis, works equally well with contextualist as with relativist semantics. Let me 
start with the sort of account that I favor, which is a kind of “contextualist” account.  
It  holds that an expression such as "sad",  in those uses in which it  is ascribed to 
propositions,  events,  or  other  entities  that are  the  causes of  sadness (rather  than 
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being ascribed to  agents who are  experiencing sadness),  comes with an  implicit  
argument. This argument behaves like a variable that takes as its values agents or 
“experiencers”,  or  rather,  groups  thereof.  So,  if  you  wish,  the  logical  form of  a 
sentence like “It  is sad that p” is, really, “It  is sad  to x's  that p”,  where the plural 
variable  x's  can take as its value one or more individuals. Reconsider the dialogue 
between Abelard and Eloise, appropriately enriched with the experiencer argument:
(10) Abelard: It is sad [to x's] that Joshua's wife is leaving him after 20 years of 
marriage.
(11) Eloise: No, that isn't sad [to y's] at all.
Abelard and Eloise will be making claims that are negations of one another only 
to the extent that the values assigned to x's and y's are the same.9 Note, however, that 
the values needn't be  exactly  the same in order to be able to derive contradiction 
between (10) and (11). Suppose that the plural variable x's in (10) receives as its 
value the group that contains Joshua together with all  of his family,  friends and 
colleagues,  while  the  variable  y's  in (11)  receives  as  its  value  the  subgroup that 
contains Joshua together with all of his family and friends but not all colleagues. 
9 In (11), negation takes wide scope over the plural quantification: we read it as “It is not the case 
that to y's, p” and not “To y's, it is not the case that p”. It remains, though, an interesting question 
whether (11) allows for a scope ambiguity – a question that I shall not try to address here.  
Emotional disagreement 23 Isidora Stojanovic
Then (10) and (11) are incompatible, so again, we might have disagreement, but 
crucially, not faultlessness: either Abelard or Eloise will be right, but not both.10 
On  the  other  hand,  it  is  easy  to  see  how we  can  have  faultlessness  without 
disagreement: consider a case in which Abelard in (10), in describing the event of 
Joshua's wife leaving him as a sad thing, speaks, as it were, from Joshua's perspective, 
while Eloise in (11), in rejecting the description of the event as a sad one, takes the 
perspective of Joshua's wife. Then the value that we would want to assign to x's in 
(10) is Joshua (or the singleton thereof), while the value assigned to y's in (11) is 
Joshua's wife. The truth of (10) will be then compatible with the truth of (11), even 
though (11) looks prima facie like the negation of (10). But crucially, in such a case, 
what initially looked like a disagreement between Abelard and Eloise will turn out 
not to be one, as the following possible continuation of the initial dialogue makes 
clear:
(12) Abelard: What I mean to be saying is that it is sad for Joshua that his wife is 
leaving him after 20 years of marriage.
(13) Eloise: I guess you're right about that, but for his wife, it isn't sad at all – quite 
10 Although one might want to say that given that there is still some misunderstanding over the 
experiencer value, we fall short of genuine disagreement. We would then have a case in which the 
two parties take themselves to be disagreeing, and only one of them is actually right, but the 
disagreement is still somewhat spurious since it partly rests on a misunderstanding. 
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to the contrary, it's fantastic that she's finally leaving him.
(14) Abelard: Yeah, I guess you're right about that.
Let  me now show how relativist  semantics can account for both scenarios.  In 
saying that it's sad that Joshua's wife is leaving him after 20 years of marriage, the  
content (or proposition, if you prefer) that Abelard expresses is one that requires, in 
order to yield a truth value, not only a world of evaluation, but also a judge (or  an 
experiencer, or a group thereof) at whom to be evaluated for truth; and similarly for 
the  content  that  Eloise  expresses.  Hence to  derive  contradiction and get  genuine 
disagreement between Abelard and Eloise, we ought to assume that the world and 
the  judge(s)  of  evaluation  are  the  same.  Suppose  that  Abelard,  in  asserting  (1),  
intends the asserted content to be evaluated for truth at the group including both 
Abelard and Eloise  and their  family,  friends  and colleagues,  and that  Eloise,  too, 
intends that same group as the appropriate value for the judge parameter at which 
her claim is to be evaluated for truth. We then have a scenario of true disagreement,  
but I submit that (at least) one of them will be expressing falsehood. On the other 
hand, suppose that Abelard intends the content that he is asserting to be evaluated 
for truth at the group including Joshua and his friends, while Eloise takes it that the 
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appropriate value is Joshua's wife and her friends. Then they may each be expressing 
truth (as evaluated with respect to these different values for the judge parameter),  
but since the intended values for the parameters of evaluation are not the same, I 
submit that their disagreement will not be any deeper than it would have been in 
(12)-(13).
VI The Problem of Residual Disagreement
The discussion from the previous section may lead one to think that the picture that I 
am working with goes more or less as follows. Expressions of emotional value, such 
as "sad" (as applied to events rather than agents), or "it is sad that", are semantically  
underspecified: in order to evaluate the claims containing such expressions for a 
truth value, one needs to specify, for instance, who the relevant experiencer(s) is 
(are),  which  can  be  done  either  by  supplying  a  value  to  a  hidden  experiencer 
argument, or by specifying the experiencer value directly at the level of evaluation 
for a truth value. Either way, once the relevant value has been specified, there is a 
matter of fact whether the claim is true or false, and any disagreement over the  
claim ought to be resolvable on objective, factual grounds.
    But, if that should be the picture, one might worry that even once the disagreeing 
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parties  have  agreed  upon some  specific  experiencer  value,  they  may  still  go  on 
disagreeing in a way that appears to be just as intractable as it was in the initial,  
underspecified case. For consider the following (albeit somewhat awkward) variant 
of Abelard and Eloise's dispute:
(15) Abelard: It is sad for Joshua, his wife and their kids and family, that she is 
leaving him after 20 years of marriage.
(16) Eloise: No, it isn't sad at all – it is actually great that she is finally leaving him.
One might insist that the disagreement between Abelard and Eloise in (15) and 
(16) is pretty much as faultless as it can get: if Abelard finds it sad – for  Joshua, his 
wife, their kids and family – that she is leaving him, and if Eloise doesn't find that sad 
at  all,  then  which  objective,  factual  grounds  could  possibly  allow  us  to  decide 
whether Abelard rather than Eloise is right,  or  the other way round? But if  this 
disagreement is one in which neither party is expressing falsehood, even though the 
values for the relevant arguments and parameters have all been duly specified, then 
don't we have a clear case of faultless disagreement after all? Or so the worry goes. 
This is a legitimate worry that I would like to address in this final section. Let me 
start by pointing out that the picture of semantic underspecification that this worry 
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presupposes is simpler than I take it to be. For I do not see any reason to assume that  
there must be a unique hidden argument associated with an evaluative expression 
such as a  predicate  of  taste  or  emotion.  To make the  point  clearer,  consider  the 
following example: 
(17) Abelard: It is good for Joshua that he drives to work every day.
(18) Eloise: No, it isn't good for Joshua that he drives to work every day.
The dispute between Abelard and Eloise may well be a genuine disagreement, but 
it may also be a spurious disagreement that rests on a misunderstanding, because 
there is still some lingering underspecification as to the issue of deciding in which  
respect it is good for Joshua that he drives to work. If Abelard intends Joshua's own 
comfort to be the relevant respect, and grounds his judgment in the thought that it is 
much better for Joshua (i.e. Joshua's comfort) to drive than spend hours commuting, 
and yet if Eloise takes Joshua's health to be the relevant respect, and grounds her 
claim on the idea that if would have been better for Joshua (i.e. Joshua's health) to  
ride a bicycle to work rather than drive, then the apparent disagreement in (17)-
(18) is, again, a case of underspecification, and fails to constitute a genuine case of 
contradiction;  witness  the  fact  that  the  following  "cumulative"  judgment  is  a 
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perfectly consistent one:
(19) Abelard/Eloise: It is good for Joshua in terms of his confort, but not in terms 
of his health, that he drives to work every day. 
The upshot of this example is that if the underspecification with the evaluative 
term 'good' is such that there is not only one hidden argument (or a corresponding 
parameter in the circumstances of evaluation) that calls for an assignment of value 
for the whole statement to yield a truth value, but several such (viz. a person, object  
or group thereof for which/whom something is good, a respect in which it is good,  
and, as with any gradable adjective, a comparison class and a threshold...), then the 
same thing is likely to happen with other evaluative predicates, such as "sad". And, if 
so, then the objection according to which the intuition of faultlessness in (15)-(16) 
cannot result from underspecification no longer goes through. For, it could be that 
the reason why both Abelard in (15) and Eloise in (16) may be saying something 
true, despite the impression that they are contradicting each other, rests on the fact 
that the respect in which Abelard judges it to be a sad thing for Joshua, his wife and 
their family that she is leaving him after 20 years of marriage, is different from the 
respect in which Eloise judges it not to be a sad thing.  
To be sure, the comparison with "good" shows that it is possible that "sad" involves 
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more than one hidden argument  (or  equivalently,  more  than one corresponding 
parameter of evaluation), such as a respect in which something is sad, in addition to 
the person (or group of people) to whom it is sad; but it doesn't show that this is the 
case. If one wished to establish that there is indeed some sort of  argument associated 
with "sad" that stands for the respect in which something is sad (and similarly for 
other  emotional  terms),  one  would  need to  engage  in  a  thourough study of  the 
lexical meaning of the predicate "sad" and other emotional vocabulary. That is a task 
for lexical semantics, which it would be unreasonable to try to carry out in a paper 
like the present one. Instead, what I would like to do it to tackle the worry outlined 
above in yet another manner. The question to which I now turn is the following. Can 
there be cases such that even after all the arguments and parameters of evaluation 
relevant to determining truth value have been identified and assigned their values, 
the  disagreeing  parties  are  still  unable  to  resolve  their  disagreement  on  purely 
objective, factual grounds? 
Suppose, for the sake of the argument, that Abelard and Eloise have reached a 
point at which there is no lingering underspecification whatsoever regarding the 
term "sad". For the sake of clarity, let their "final" disagreement be expressed in the 
following dialogue (where we should assume, in addition, that the class of events 
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relative to which the sadness of Joshua's wife leaving him is being evaluated is the 
same for Abelard and Eloise, and that they place the threshold at the same level):  
(20) Abelard: It is sad for Joshua, his wife and their kids and family, in every single 
respect, that she is leaving him after 20 years of marriage.
(21) Eloise: No, it isn't sad – in certain respects, it is actually great that she is 
finally leaving him.
How could one adjudicate the dispute in (20)-(21)? Perhaps one could mesure 
the emotional reactions of Joshua, his wife, and other members of the family, and see 
if, overall, the event of her leaving him has rendered them sad or not, and in which 
respect(s). Suppose that such a study has been done, and that Abelard and Eloise are 
equally aware of the results of the protagonists' emotional reactions. In other words, 
Abelard and Eloise are not talking past each other, they have endeavored to specify 
the meanings of the terms involved in their disagreement in every possible way, they 
are evaluating the sadness of the event at stake against the same comparison class, 
and, what is more, they have equally good knowledge of all the relevant facts! Yet 
couldn't it be that they are still unable to resolve their disagreement? Suppose that 
Abelard interprets the facts at stake (i.e. the various emotional reactions) as good 
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evidence for the judgment that the event at stake is sad, and Eloise interprets the very 
same facts as supporting the judgment that it isn't sad. In other words, they are at a 
point where their dispute turns on a disagreement of what it takes for something to 
be a sad thing (or, if you prefer, to count as such). Doesn't it look, then, as if we had 
finally hit a case of genuine disagreement, yet one in which neither party is wrong?
The problem of residual disagreement, in sum, is that there seem to be cases in 
which the two parties disagree as to whether something is an instance of F (for F  
some predicate) because they disagree over what it takes for something to be F, or to 
count as an F. And it is (arguably) a problem because in such cases, the disagreement 
appears to be genuine, the two parties are not victims of any misunderstanding, and 
nevertheless, there is no matter of fact as to which party is right (or if you wish, 
which party is more right than the other).      
Drawing on ideas that have emerged from different horizons,11 I would like to 
propose that we consider such cases of  residual disagreement as cases of  practical 
disagreement of a special sort, namely, cases in which the parties disagree on how to 
best shape, or extend, a certain concept that is still under construction, so to speak.  
To illustrate the idea (as I would like to construe it), consider the following dialogue: 
11 See e.g. Ch. 6 of MacFarlane (2012), and, to some extent and with some caution, Ch. 4 of Richard 
(2008); for a different take, see Sosa (2010).   
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(22) Abelard: Joshua has more than 20 publications.
(23) Eloise: No, he doesn't.
Suppose that Abelard and Eloise both know exactly what Joshua has written and 
published and where – in other words, they know all the relevant facts. Furthermore, 
let there be among Joshua's writings a number of online conference working papers,  
and suppose that when those are taken into account, he has more than 20 items, but  
not otherwise. Now, if Abelard counts such working papers as "publications" while 
Eloise  doesn't,  what  will  ground their  disagreement  in (22)-(23)  is  precisely  the 
question of  what  one  ought  to  count  as  a  publication.  To put  it  differently,  the 
concept of a publication that Abelard and Eloise share does not yet determine by 
itself whether an online conference working paper should or shouldn't fall  in its 
extension. It is what we might call an open-ended concept, and there is a practical 
issue of deciding whether or not to extend it in such a way as to include among its 
instances  a  certain  kind  of  "new"  objects  (viz.  online  working papers).  Abelard's 
judgment in (22) is, indirectly, a proposal to extend that concept in such a way that 
it will include online working papers, while Eloise in (23) puts forward a proposal in 
the opposite direction. 
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My suggestion, then, is that we view the cases of what looks like an intractable 
disagreement over matters of evaluative character, including matters of taste and of 
emotional value, as cases of practical disagreement over the issue of how to construe 
and apply the concept itself of a given value. To some, this may look like a sheer case  
of metalinguistic disagreement.12 However, although I do not deny that there may be 
a metalinguistic component involved, what matters is the fairly striking difference 
with other cases of metalinguistic disagreement, where the two parties get into a 
dispute simply because they happen to attach different meanings to the words used – 
as would be, to take an extreme case, a dispute over the question whether Joshua 
lives near a bank, in which the one party intends to be talking about a river bank, 
and the other, about a financial institution.
 More interestingly, we can ask ourselves whether the disagreements in (20)-(21) 
and in (22)-(23) are faultless. If we accept the idea of an open-ended concept, then 
indeed,  to  the  extent  that  at  the  time  of  the  disagreement,  the  concept's  precise 
extension is not yet fully determined, neither of the parties will be strictly speaking 
wrong. In terms of the quadrilemma that we started with in Sect. I, it is assumption c, 
which holds that both statements have a truth value, that we might end up dropping. 
12 Indeed, that is the line defended e.g. in Sundell (2011).   
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But the crucial point is that, although at the time of dispute, the concept may be 
open-ended, and the two statements may consequently lack truth values, the way in 
which the  concept  and  the  use  of  the  corresponding term develop  will  make  it 
possible to decide, albeit retrospectively, which of the two parties got it right.13    
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